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nAPPHIIA IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES
David E. Fredrickson
Introduction
A study of Paul’s Tcapprjaia promises to relate his letters to a key
concept shared by ancient politics, rhetoric, and philosophy. Abraham
Malherbe has shown how a number of texts in Paul’s letters, Acts
and the Pastoral Episdes are illumined by philosophic mppijola in
particular.1 Other scholars, however, have argued that Paul shows
little interest in ancient traditions concerning free speech.2 Following
Malherbe’s lead, the present study aims to deepen appreciation for
Paul’s engagement with his world of thought and to clarify some of
his arguments by placing his references to free speech in Phlm 8-9,
1 Thess 2:1-12, Phil 1:12-20, and 2 Cor 1-7 in a philosophic context.
Before turning to these passages and their philosophic background,
a misconception which has hindered modem treatments of Paul’s
7iapprja{a must be addressed. In contrast to an ancient definition which
understood Tcappriafa to be boldness in words (to ev Xoyoiq Gappeiv),3
modem exegetes have emphasized the aposde’s boldness nearly to
the exclusion of his words.4 For example, the phrase tioAAti rcappriauji
XpcopeGa in 2 Cor 3:12 is frequently translated “we have much
1 See his ‘“Gentle as a Nurse’: The Cynic Background to I Thess ii,” NovT 12
(1970) 208-17; Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care (For
tress: Philadelphia, 1987) 81-94; “‘Pastoral Care’ in the Thessalonian Church,” JTTS
36 (1990) 375-91; “Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War,” HTR 76 (1983)
156-62. For the “philosophic” Paul in Acts, see “‘Not in a Comer’: Early Christian
Apologetic in Acts 26:26,” The Second Century 5 (1985-1986) 193-210. For nappTioia
in moral admonition, see “Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles,” in Texts and
Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers (ed. W. E. March; San
Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1980) 24-31 and “‘In Season and Out of
Season’: 2 Timothy 4:2,” JBL 103 (1984) 235-43.
2 S. Marrow, ilParrhesia and the New Testament,” CBQ 44 (1982) 439, 446.
3 Lex. Vind. n 100 (A. Nauck, Lexicon vindobonense [Petersburg, 1867; reprint.
Hildesheim: Olms, 1965] 152). The definition does mention, however, a metaphori
cal sense.
4 H. Schlier, “Tlapprioia, 7tappr\oia^opai,” TDNT 5 (1967) 883. For the begin
ning of a course correction, see W. C. van Unnik, “The Christian’s Freedom
of Speech,” Sparsa Collecta: The Collected Essays of W. C. van Unnik (NovTSup 2931; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973-83) 2.276. He is not consistent on this point, however;
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confident” rather than “we use much bold
boldness” or “we are very
h ”5 2 Cor 7:4 is translated in a similar fashion; jcoAAti hoi
is rendered “great is my confidence in you” rather
than “great is my bold speech toward you.
A brief review of the phrase «xppr|cna xpfio6ai warns against equat
ing Paul’s jtappricna with confidence and also indicates his familiarity
with a commonplace expression for rhetorical activity. Demosthenes,
according to Caecilius Calactinus, was “accustomed to use bold speech
(mppiicna %piia0ai).”7 Centuries later Philostratus’ description of
Menippus shows that the phrase refers to a manner of speaking: “he
was by now a qualified disputant and remarkably outspoken (nappriaia
XpfjaGai Seivog rjv).”8 The phrase frequently occurs in discussions of
the proper method of moral admonition. While Epicurus thought
the proclamation of his views on nature was a use of free speech
beneficial to the human race,9 his followers broadened Ttapp-poia to
moral exhortation in general.10 Just as the physician uses medical
see his “The Semitic Background of IIAPPHZIA in the New Testament,” in Sparsa
Collecta, 2.296-305.
5 A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to
the Corinthians (ICC; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915) 215; H. Holstein,
“La parresia dans le Nouveau Testament,” BVC 11 (1963) 51; G. Scarpat, Parrhesia:
Storia del termine e delle sue traduzione in latino (Brescia: Paideia, 1964) 79; V. Furnish,
II Corinthians (AB 32A; Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1984) 231. Bultmann’s as
sertion that nappTiaia is equivalent to rcenoiOriou; succincdy states the misconception
I am seeking to identify (The Second Letter to the Corinthians [Minneapolis: Augsburg,
1985] 85).
6 G. F. C. Heinrici rejected “freedom of speech” advocated by Beza, Luther,
and others (Der zjveite Brief an die Korinther [MeyerK; 7th ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1890] 216). He has persuaded most subsequent interpreters. See
Plummer, 7he Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 215; Windisch, Der zweite
Konntherbrief (MeyerK; 9th ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924) 223;
Holstein, “La parresia dans le Nouveau Testament,” 45-46; D. Smolders “L’audace
de l’apotre scion saint Paul: Le theme de la parresia,” Collectanea mechliniensia 43
(1958) 125. Lexical evidence strongly supports the “bold speech toward” translation.
See Dio Chrys. Or. 43.7: eytb 5e exo> nappnoiav npoq upa^ octtjv ot)8eiq. Note the equiva
lence of exeiv xappriaiav and
nappTioi^ in Plut. De exil. 606B-C. For further
examples of nappnofanpo<;riva, see Eur. El. 1056; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.74.3; Plut.
Praec. ger. reip. 805B; Joseph. AJ 2.52; Acts Jo. 33; Lib. Or. 15.12.
7 Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 139 (E. Ofenloch, Caecilii Calactini fragmenta [Leipzig:
Teubner, 1907; repr. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967] 122). Cf. Ps.-Lucian, Dem. Enc. 36.
See further PI. Ep. 8.354A; Isoc. Or. 9.39; Demades, frg. 97; Plut. Lys. 22.1; Reg. et
imp. ap. 190F; Ap. Lac. 229C.
8 Philostr. VA 5.43. Cf. Dion. Hal. Rhet. 9.15. For the speaker’s desire to benefit
the state through his use of free speech, see Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.32.7; 10.13.6;
11.56.5; Polyb. 2.8.9; Aristid. Rhetor, Or. 3.118.
9 Epicur. SV 29.
10 Phld. Lib. frg. 7.
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instruments to treat disease, so the Epicurean leader used rcappriala
to treat moral failure.11 Likewise, Plutarch associates the use of bold
words with the treatment of disease.12 riappiiaia, like a drug em
ployed too frequendy, can be entirely used up.13 The phrase is syn
onymous with vouBetew, ETrmpav, E^eyxeiv and other terms denoting
moral reproof.14 Using TCappuala is a matter of speaking the truth in
order to treat spiritual ailments.15
These passages suggest that the proper way to understand Pauline
reap patriot is not to focus on the apostle’s consciousness but to de
scribe the character and legitimation of his ministry as a public,
rhetorical activity. To do this we must orient ourselves within the
philosophic tradition which took very seriously, as Paul did, the ev
Xoyou; aspect of mppiicua.

Free Speech, Freedom, and Friendship
By the time of the Pauline epistles, the nature of free speech was a
controversial matter. Was it simply the verbal expression of the sage’s
freedom or was it also an art to be employed for the improvement
of others? As we will see, this tension between expression and art
plays a major role in Paul’s treatment of his own 7iappTia{a.
The grounding of rcappriaCa in etauGepia originates in Athens’
decision to grant free speech to all of its freeborn, male citizens.16 As
a rule, aliens and slaves were not permitted to speak freely.17 Loss of

11 Phld. Lib. frgs. 64-65; col. VA. The phrase npoo(pepeiv nappnmav also alludes
to medical practice. See Phld. Lib. frg. 3; Dio Chrys. Or. 77/78.45.
12 Plut. Adulator 7 ID: GepaneimKtix; xp^^ai til rtappriaiqt. For a full discussion of
this treatise by Plutarch, see Trocls Engberg-Pedersen’s essay in this volume (Chap
ter Three).
13 Plut. Adulator 73A-B.
14 Plut. De aud. 47A-B; Adulator 66A; Coniug. praec. 139F; De exit. 606C; Quaest.
corn. 617F; Dio Chrys. Or. 51.4; Philo, Her. 19; Julian, Or. 6.201A-C; Suda 0 636.
15 Dio Chrys. Or. 33.7.
16 For Tcappnaia in Athenian democracy, see E. Peterson, “Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte
von napprioia,” Reinhold Seeberg Festschrift (ed. W. Koepp; 2 vols.; Leipzig: D. W.
Scholl, 1929) 1.283-84; Schlier, “napprioia, nappncndCopai,” 871-72. Scarpat’s treat
ment is superior, since he includes synonyms of napprioia (Parrhesia, 11-45). For a
rare instance of women claiming this civic right, see Plut. Com. Lyc. et Mum. 3.5.
17 Lucian, lupp. Trag. 32. Nevertheless, cities sometimes relaxed the rule. See Dem.
Or. 9.3; 58.68; Isoc. Or. 6.97-98. Greek drama provides evidence that the lack of
free speech was the most serious disadvantage of slaves and aliens. See Eur. Ion
670-75; Phoen. 393; Aesch. Supp. 197-203; Stob. Flor. 3.13.2, 16, 30.
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free speech was considered a grievous misfortune by the freeborn.18
Euripides has Polyneices put deprivation of free speech at the top of
the list of hardships brought about by exile, since without it one was
reduced to the lot of a slave.19 Subjection to a tyrant meant the loss
of free speech; rid of him, the citizens regained TtappTiala.20
Philosophers took the position that the basis of free speech was
moral, not civic, freedom. The popular story of the sale of Diogenes
portrays the sage whose competence (8t>vapi<;, ixavoTriq) to rule him
self gives him the right to rule others.21 Similarly, Plutarch argued
against Polyneices’ view that the most vexing aspect of exile was the
loss of free speech.22 Plutarch asserts that baseness alone makes one
speak like a slave.23 The Cynic’s self-confident use of xappTioia is an
extreme development of this pattern of legitimation.24 The wise man’s
absolute moral superiority to a society convulsed with vice and dis
cord accounts for the intensity and self-confidence of Cynic free
speech.25 Although the literature sometimes mentions the cure of
human ills as the Cynic’s motivation, more often the utterance of
bold words aimed at displaying true freedom.26
Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom rejected the Cynic view that
self-confidence is sufficient authority for bold speech. They proposed
that the divine order of the universe is the source of the wise man’s
free speech.27 This point Epictetus stresses in his highly Stoicized
18 Dem., frg. 21; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.31.2; Lib. Or. 15.57.
19 Eur. Phoen. 390-92. See also Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 19.18.3-4.
20 For this theme in Herodotus, see V. Ehrenberg, “Origins of Democracy,” Historia
1 (1950) 526-27. See also Dem. Or. 7.1; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.42.5; 4.46.4; Diod.
Sic. 32.26.2; Plut. Dion 34.4; Tim. 37.3; An virt. doc. poss. 240B.
21 See K. Joel, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates (2 vols.; Berlin: R. Gaertners
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1893-1901) 2.520-22, 1053-98; G. Giannantoni, Socraticorum
reliquiae (4 vols.; Rome: Edizioni dell’Athcneo, 1983-85) 2.439-48; 3.405-11. Be
yond the Diogenes tradition, see Teles, frg. Ill; Philo, Prob. 29-31; Epict. Diss. 3.22.49,
72-73.
22 Eur. Phoen. 390-92.
23 Plut. De exit. 606D. See also Mus. Ruf, frg. DC.
24 Although Stoics and Cynics both advocated the notion of freedom as autonomy,
their views are not identical. For the greater weight in Cynicism on action and
alteration of life style in comparison with the Stoic emphasis on reason, see J. Rist,
Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 62-63.
25 For vicious society and the virtuous Cynic sage, see Ps.-Crates, Ep. 7; Ps.-Diog.
Ep. 28; Ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 2, 7, 9; Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.25-56; Dio Chrys. Or.
33.14-15. See G. A. Gerhard, Phoinix von Kobphon: Texte und Untersuchungen (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1909) 67-68.
26 A. J. Malherbe, “Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics,” in Self-Definition
in the Greco-Roman World, vol. 3 of Jewish and Christian Self-Definition (3 vols.; ed. B. F.
Meyer and E. P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 54.
27 This is not simply a reaction against the voluntarism present in the Cynic view
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description of the ideal Cynic. Unlike the false Cynic, who finds
itinerancy convenient and the role of moral critic a pretext for selfassertion,28 the true Cynic does not begin his mission without God.29
Having God as his guide, the philosopher avoids the charge of arbi
trarily setting off upon the course of improving others.30 Dio
Chrysostom also placed the philosopher’s bold speech in the context
of a divine commission.31 He compares his mission to that of Socrates
who acted in obedience to the command of God (to too 0eou
TtpoaTaypa).32
So far we have examined the pattern of legitimation of free speech.
We turn now to the issues of motives and benefits. Free speech was
the cornerstone of Athenian democracy, the goad compelling citizens
to do their duty, and the most effective means of preserving the city’s
freedom and safety.33 To preserve and improve the city,34 the orator
must hide nothing,35 open his mouth,36 and proclaim the truth.37 Demos
thenes’ concluding remark in Or. 4 points to the value of free speech:
For my own part, I have never yet chosen to court your favor (rcpcx; x&piv
eiXopriv Aiyeiv) by saying anything that I was not quite convinced would
be to your advantage; and to-day, keeping nothing back (imooTeiAapevoq),
I have given free utterance (7i87tappr|a(aopai) to my plain sentiments.38

of philosophic mission but reflects the fundamental Stoic teaching that the freedom
of the wise man depends on subordination to divine will. See K. Deissner, “Das
Sendungsbewusstsein der Urchristenhcit,” %ST 7 (1930) 781-87.
28 Epict. Diss. 3.22.9-12, 50; 4.8.34. For the condemnation of the use of bold
speech for self-glorification, see Phld. Lib. frg. 72; col. IB; Ps.-Diog. Ep. 4; Dio Chrys.
Or. 32.11; Philo, Somn. 2.83-89; Plut. Pomp. 60.4; Dion 8.1; Lucian, Demon. 48; Lear.
30-31; Vit. Auci. 10; Arc. 31; Peregr. 18; Aristid. Rhetor, Or. 3.668; Chrys. Pan. Bab.
2 37, 45-48 {PG 50.543, 545-46).
29 Epict. Diss. 3.22.2, 8, 52.
30 Epict. Diss. 3.21.11-12. See also 3.22.95-97. This is the main point of
Ps.-Socrates, Ep. 1.7-12. See M. Imhof, “Sokrates und Archelaos: Zum 1.
Sokratesbrief,” MH 41 (1984) 1-8.
31 Dio Chrys. Or. 77/78.38.
32 Dio Chrys. Or. 33.9.
33 Dem. Or. 13.15; 60.25-26; Plut. Phoc. 2.3; Dio Chrys. Or. 32.27. For the Ro
man counterpart, see Plut. Adulator 60C.
34 Plut. Dem. 12.3; \ 4.Adulator 60C; Lucian, Dear. Cone. 2-4, 14; Stob. Flor. 3.13.24.
35 For anoKpvmTEiv, see Xen. Ages. 11.5; Dem. Or. 6.31—32; Isoc. Or. 8.62; 15.43
44; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.72.5; 10.13.6; Lib. Prog. 6.2.14. For vkocteUew, see
Dem. Or. 19.237; Isoc. Or. 9.39; Aeschin. Fab. Leg. 70; Lib. Decl. 15.1.39. Cf. Acts
20:20, 27. Note the numerous synonyms in Lucian, Deor. Cone. 2.
36 Isoc. Or. 12.96.
37 For Kocpprioia making &Xri0Eia manifest, see Dem. Or. 6.31-32; 11.17; 23.204;
37.55; 60.26; Isoc. Ep. 4.6. In the philosophers, see Dio Chrys. Or. 32.7; Eus. Mynd.,
frg. 21.
Dem. Or. 4.51. See also Or. 10.76. For other accounts of Demosthenes’ nappnoia,
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Isocrates, too, was adept at portraying the benefits of his rcappricna.39
He contrasts himself with flattering orators who speak for the pleas
ure but not the benefit of their hearers.40 Distinguishing his free speech
from XoiSopia on the basis of the benefit intended,41 he hides noth
ing and speaks painful words for the public’s well-being.42 The speaker’s
claim to benefit his audience became a standard rhetorical device to
make vexing words less offensive.43
Philosophers also emphasized the benefits of free speech uttered in
friendly concern. Demonax used free speech, but his goal was always
to improve others and foster friendship.44 Demonax also exemplifies
the civic responsibility which characterized free speech in Athenian
democracy.45 He claims that his bold speech is motivated by philan
thropy.46 As Dio Chrysostom put it, the sage “does not hide his
thoughts (ouk drcoKpDTiTopevoc;) from others,” especially his “fellow
citizens and friends and kinsmen.”47 It is the duty of the philosopher
to benefit (cbcpetaiv) others, even if this requires a painful dose of
Kappriaia.48 Dio claims that his own bold words of reproof are tolerable because they are beneficial and motivated by good will (evvoia).49
Bold speech was not limited to the improvement of public morals
but was also an important feature of exhortation among friends.50

see Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 141; Plut. Dm. 9.1-2; 12.3; Anstid. Rhetor, Or. 2.186
87; Lib. Decl. 22.1.14; Arg. D. 7.4; Ps.-Lucian, Dm. Enc. 41-42.
39 Isoc. Or. 8.5, 10.
40 Isoc. Or. 8.3-5.
41 Isoc. Or. 8.72-73. Cf. Isoc. Or. 4.130-31. For other instances of this distinc
tion, see Phld. Lib. frg. 60; Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 139; Plut. Adulator 66A; 70E;
Bas., Ep. 203.2; 204.4; Them. Or. 22.277A-C; Eus. Mynd., frg. 21.
42 Isoc. Or. 8.38-41. Orators in later periods also saw the apologetic value of
labeling their discourse napprioia and pointing out its benefits. See Dio Chrys. Or.
38.4-5, 7; Aristid. Rhetor, Or. 23.4-5; Lucian, Merc. Cond. 4; Lib. Or. 15.12-13;
16.3,16; 30.30; 48.1; Gr. Naz. Or. 17.8 {PG 35.976); Or. 18.37 {PG 35.1036); Or.
33.1 {PG 36.216). In epistolary contexts, see Alciphr. Ep. 2.39.3; Bas., Ep. 58; 204.2;
Gr. Naz. Ep. 17.2-3. For napprjcna as a figure of thought, see Rhet. Her. 4.36.4837.50; cf. Quintilian’s objections {Inst. 9.2.27; 9.3.99).
43 Dem. Or. 3.3; 8.32; 9.3-4; Isoc. Or. 5.72; 8.72-73; Anaximenes {Rh. Al. 18.2)
treats the speaker’s claim of nocppTictia as an instance of anticipation (npoKcrtdXT|\yi(;).
44 Lucian, Demon. 7, 10.
45 Lucian, Dmon. 11. Cf. Philo, Spec. 1.319-23.
46 Lucian, Demon. 11. Cf. Epict. Diss. 3.22.81-82, 96. For the importance of
KTiSEHovia in the administration of napptioia, see Phld. Lib. frg. 26; Dio Chrys. Or.
32.11; 51.4; 77/78.39; Plut. Adulator 55B; 66D.
47 Dio Chrys. Or. 77/78.42; cf. Or. 13.15.
48 Epict. Diss. 3.1.10-11.
49 Dio Chrys. Or. 32.5, 7, 11. Cf. Lucian, Hermot. 51.
50 Plut. Adulator 55B-C; Max. Tyr. Or. 14.6C; 19.4C; Cic. Amic. 13.44; 18.65;

nAPPHIIA IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES

169

Isocrates mentions the bold speech of friends as a traditional means
of moral development.51 According to Plutarch, Ttappiioia is the lan
guage of friendship,52 and only the friend can hurt another with
salutary results.53 Rather than simply the verbal expression of free
dom,54 bold speech for Plutarch is a “fine art ((piXxnexveiv), inasmuch
as it is the greatest and most potent medicine in friendship, always
needing, however, all care to hit the right occasion (mipou), and a
tempering with moderation (pitpov).”55 To observe the xatpoc; meant
to adapt words to the circumstances of the hearer.56 To find the
mean (pexpov) in bold speech meant to steer between flattery and
excessive severity.57
Friendship was a presupposition for the administration of mppT|aia
in Epicurean groups. Philodemus exhorted the older members to teach
the duties of friendship to recent converts. The chief duty was to
speak candidly about one another’s faults.58 The leader of the cell
was to be regarded as the most eminent of friends from whom no
secrets should or could be kept.59 Furthermore, new members were
to be reminded repeatedly about the moral improvement which re
sulted from Tcapp-naia.60 Philodemus thought that this instruction se
cured a positive reception of criticism given by the leader as well as

24.88-90; Sen. Ep. 25.1; Stob. Flor. 3.13.44; Ael. VH 8.12; Gr. Naz. Ep. 206.1. See
G. Bohnenblust, Beitrage
Topos nEPI<J>IAIAX (Berlin: Gustav Schade [Otto Francke],
1905) 35-36, 38-39; Scarpat, Parrhesia, 58-61. Most helpful are the following treatments: M. Gigante, “Philodeme: Sur la liberte de parole,” Association Guillaume Bude:
Actes du Vllle Congres (Paris: Societe d’Edition <Les Belles Lettres>, 1969) 196-98,
202-14, and I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisck-romische Tradition der Seelenleitung (Quellen
und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophic 13; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969)
63-66.
51 Isoc. Or. 2.3. Cf. Plut. Adulator 74C; De prof, in virt. 82A; De cap. ex in. ut. 89B.
52 Plut. Adulator 51G. Cf. Philo, Her. 21.
53 Plut. Adulator 55G; 59D.
54 Plut. Adulator 59E.
55 Plut. Adulator 74D. See also Sen. Ep. 29.1-3. For the administration of nappnoia
as a rexvn, see Gigante, “Philodeme: Sur la liberte de parole, 202—11; Malherbe,
‘“In Season and Out of Season’,” 236-40.
56 Plut. Adulator 66B; 68D-70B. Cf. Phld. Lib. frg. 7.
57 Plut. Adulator 66E. For xexvii in the Epicurean search for the mean between
constant severity and indulgence, see Phld. Lib. frg. 20; col. IIIB.
58 Phld. Lib. frgs. 11, 15, 25. This duty was derived from the example of Epicurus
himself. See Phld. Lib. frgs. 6, 20, 49 and W. Schmid, “Contritio und 1 ultima linea
rerum’ in neuen epikureischen Texten,” RhM 100 (1957) 303-14. For a full discus
sion of Philodemus’ treatment of napprioia, see the essay by Clarence E. Glad in
this volume (Chapter Two).
59 Phld. Ub. frg. 41.
60 Phld. Ub. frgs. 26, 28, 36, 39-41, 49-50.
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by fellow students.61 Experience taught that if a new convert forgot
the benefits of bold speech he would react in confusion and anger. 62
Indeed, the main source of anger was the convert’s belief that he
was being treated insincerely.63 If, however, the indoctrination was
successful, he would be grateful for the candor and look upon the
stinging words as an expression of friendship.64

Free Speech in the Pauline Epistles
Having reviewed the importance of legitimation and friendship in
ancient discussions of Ttappriaioc, we are now ready to investigate the
term in the Pauline epistles. Paul makes a single but significant ref
erence to his free speech in Phlm 8-9: “Although I have much free
speech in Christ (noXkr\v ev Xpioxcp 7iappr|(riav) to command to you
what is fitting, rather, on account of love, I exhort.” The issue of
legitimation is present in the phrase “in Christ.” As we will see, Paul
consistently locates his bold speech in Christ or in God. This has a
formal parallel in the relationship between freedom and bold speech
in the philosophers and especially the demand by Dio Chrysostom
and Epictetus that the philosophic missionary seek divine approval.
Obviously, the “in Christ” is a different legitimation than the Stoic
view of providence and may even be understood as the apostle’s
attempt to distinguish the basis of his speech from philosophic le
gitimation.
We also find here the common association of rcappricua and friend
ship. Paul points out that on account of love he adapts his speech to
Philemon. He exhorts (jtaparaXeiv) him as a friend rather than com
manding (eniTaaaeiv) him as an inferior. This contrast is reminiscent
of the debate between the harsh Cynics, whose napprioia was often
described in terms of tyranny,65 and the mild Cynics and other phi
losophers who emphasized friendship and adaptability. At the heart

61 Phld. Lib. frg. 12.
62 Phld. Lib. col. XXIA.
63 Phld. Lib. col. XVIB.
64 Phld. Lib.frgs. 25 and 36; cols. VIIIB, XB, and XIVB. See N. De Witt,
“Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups,” CP 31 (1936) 207; A. T. Guerra,
“Filodemo sulla gratitudine,” CErc 7 (1977) 105—06.
65 Dio Chrys. Or. 9.11-13; Ps.-Diog. Ep. 46; Ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 4.3; 7.4; Epict. Diss.
2.12.24; 4.8.26-29; Lucian, Fug. 12, 17.
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of the debate was the philosopher’s freedom.66 Since rcappuaia, the
verbal expression of freedom, was the Cynic’s highest value,67 the
issue was whether the philosopher could accommodate his words to
the needs and circumstances of his hearers and still maintain his
integrity.68 Harsh Cynics, from whose perspective accommodation
smacked of flattery and ruined freedom,69 criticized Antisthenes and
his characterization of Odysseus for weakness.70 The significance of
Phlm 8-9 is to be found in the context of this debate. Paul identifies
himself with the position which found no contradiction between free
dom and adaptability. He avoids causing shame to Philemon, and at
the same time strategically maintains his Tiappriaia by appealing to
the tradition which viewed free speech as a fine art best employed
by a caring friend.
Another passage in which free speech plays an important role is
1 Thess 2:1-12. Abraham Malherbe has argued that here Paul por
trays his ministry in commonplaces concerning the philosopher’s
demeanor and free speech.71 I will make a few comments which
support this position. Just as in Phlm 8-9, Paul claims the right to
free speech but avoids the harsh Cynic connotations by stressing that
his speech is hortatory, even comforting. Indeed, as Malherbe has
pointed out, the capacity for weightiness to which Paul alludes in
2:7—only immediately to reject—evokes the stereotype of the harsh
Cynic’s mppricna. Similarly, Paul’s denial of seeking glory contrasts
with the criticism made about Cynics whose free speech aimed at
enhancing their own reputations for freedom.72
Remarkable also is the link between rcapp-ncna and friendship in
this passage. The hardships in Philippi and the phrase ev rcoM/p aycovi
underscore the price Paul pays for his bold speech. The sage s
endurance of hardships demonstrated his love of humanity, as
we see from Antisthenes to Dio Chrysostom.73 Furthermore, Paul’s
nurse-like quality, his desire to impart his very self, and his labor all
demonstrate that his 7tappT|a(a is an expression of friendship.
66 R. Hock, “Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cyme,” GRBS 17 (1976) 48 53.
67 See Diog. Laert. 6.69.
68 Dio Chrysostom has no doubt that he could (Or. 77/78.38).
69
Ps.-Diog. Ep. 29.3, 5.
70 Dio Chrys. Or. 8.2; Ps.-Crates, Ep. 19.
71 ‘“Gentle as a Nurse,’” 208-17.
72 See above note 28.
73 See R. Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man
(Lund: Carl Blom, 1948) 97. Cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 32.8, 24; 33.15. For the dangers
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The issue of the legitimation of free speech is also present in
1 Thess 2:1-12. Three times he calls attention to the divine origin of
his speech: £7tappTiaiaadpE0a ev tcd Gecd Tipcov (2:2); aA,Ad kocGox; 6e5oKip.dap.e0a utco xou 0eou niaTEvGfjvai to EuayyEXiov (2:4); and 0ecd to)
SoKipdCovxi xac, KapSiaq Tipwv (2:4). The philosopher’s consciousness
of divine providence distinguished his 7tappr)aia from self-assertion.
In spite of this parallel, however, the theological legitimation of speech
in Paul appears to have a different purpose. The characterization of
God as one who tests hearts may help explain the force of linking
his speech to God’s approval. If the heart can be associated with the
theme of friendship, then God’s approval of Paul means approval of
his use of rappriaia in the context of friendship. God sanctions Paul’s
adaptability in speech and his practice of taking into account the
circumstances of his hearers.
We turn now to an examination of rcappriaia in Paul’s letter to
the Philippians. The emphasis on the public character of the gospel
in 1:12-20 is striking.74 Paul refers to his own free speech in 1:20 (ev
ouSev'i aiaxuv0f|oopai aXV ev Tcda-p napp-nata dog 7tdvxox£ xai vuv
p£yaA.uv0r|a£Tai Xptaxoq ev tcd acopaxi pou) after alluding in 1:14 to
the bold speaking of the majority of the brothers (xoXpav cx<popcog tov
Xoyov AxxXeTv). In both cases Paul insists that his imprisonment is not
a cause for shame and silence.75 Quite the opposite. The brothers in
the Lord gain their confidence (nETioiOoxag, 1:14), the psychological
basis of bold speech,76 from Paul’s bonds (xoi<; 8eapoiq poo, 1:14). What
appears from a societal standpoint to inhibit free speech has actually
contributed to making the gospel more public (eiq rcpoKOTrnv too
euayyeXiou, 1:12). This paradox of the gospel entering and shaping
the public realm through the suffering and shameful position of Christ,
Paul, and the church will be developed further in the first two chap
ters of the letter.
Paul’s manner of speech is the central topic of 2 Cor 1-7. In 3:12
and 7:4 he claims that he uses much free speech. Synonyms of
faced by bold speakers, see Lucian, Pise. 20; Peregr. 32. See Malherbe, ‘“Gentle as
a Nurse’,” 209.
74 Note the other terms denoting speech in the public realm: tov Xpioxov
tcnpuooouoiv (1:15); anoXoyiav xov ruayyeXiov (1:16); tov Xpioxov KaxaYyeXXoooiv (1:17);
Xpioxoq KaxayyeXcxai (1:18); peyaXuvOrioexai Xpioxov (1:20). On Philippians and Paul’s
use of friendship language in that letter, see the essays in Part Two of this volume
by John Reumann, Ken L. Berry, Abraham J. Malherbe, and John T. Fitzgerald.
75 For the connection between shame and silence, sec below note 116.
76 See below notes 103-106.
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Ttappucna occur throughout 2 Cor 1-7 at crucial points in the argu
ment. This raises the question why so much of 2 Cor 1—7 is devoted
to the topic of Paul’s speech. In 2 Cor 10:9-10 we learn that the
severity of the so-called “letter of tears” proved to Paul’s critics in
Corinth that he was capable of mppuoia. Yet, when they compared
his letters with his mild and conciliatory manner in the presence of
the church, they detected a major flaw in his character. He was bold
through letters but an ironic deceiver in person. Paul’s speech, they
said, was attenuated (6 Xoyoq e^ouSevn pivcx;), a judgement couched in
rhetorical terminology.77 Rhetoric provided for the attenuation of
speech, which consisted of orators intentionally resembling “untrained
and unskillful speakers.”78 Attenuation was employed chiefly to achieve
irony.79 One reason, then, Tiapprpna figures so prominently in 2 Cor
1-7 is that Paul must answer the charge that he lacks bold speech in
face to face situations. Paul responds to this charge in two ways:
1) brief affirmations of straightforward speech and denials of flattery
and 2) a sustained defense of his ministry in 2 Cor 3.
We may begin with the affirmations and denials. In 1:12 Paul
describes his behavior in terms of straightforward speech: ev auXoviyn
and ev eitaicpiveia xou 0eou. Chrysippus claimed that the wise man is
always open (arcXouq), without disguise (obitaxaxot;) and never employs
irony (to eipcoveueoflai).80 From the standpoint of rhetorical theory,
speaking anXSic, was the opposite of concealing one’s thoughts under
figures (axtipaxi^ew).81 Similarly, the notion of pure (raBapoc;) speech,
to which Paul refers in the phrase ev eiA.iKpivei(jt,82 pointed to clear
77 Julius Rufianus, De figuris sententiarum et ebcutionis 6; J. C. G. Emesti, lexicon
technobgiae Graecorum rheloricae (Leipzig: Fritsch, 1795) 114.
78 Cic. Oral. 20.
79 Hor. Sat. 1.10.11-15; Cic. De Or. 3.202; Brut. 292; Philostr. VA 1.17.
80 SVF 3.161.3-6. Cf. Arist. Eth. Eud. 3.7.6. See L. Bergson, “Eiron und Eironeia,”
Hermes 99 (1971) 416. Later philosophers agreed that the person of solid character
would be straightforward and conceal nothing. See R. Vischer, Das einfache Leberv
Wort- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu einem Wertbegrijf der antiken Literatur
(Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenshaft 11; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1965) 10-22. For deception versus straightforwardness, see Dio Chrys. Or. 51.1;
52:16; Epict. Diss. 2.22.35; Plut. Dion 8.3; Adulator 52B; 62C; Mar. Ant. Med. 11.15;
Clem. Al. Str. 7.7.44.8; Julian, Or. 7.214A-C.
81 Dion. Hal. Rhet. 8.3, 5. For the contrast between direct speaking and speech
which relies upon cleverness and deception, see Antisth., frg. 51; Dio Chrys. Or.
35.1. See also Phld. Lib. frg. 10, for which the discussion provided by M. Gigante
(“Philodeme: Sur la liberte de parole,” 208-09) is helpful.
82 For unambiguous speech described as eiXucpivfiq see Sext. Emp. fyr. 1.134;
1.140; 1.207.

174

DAVID E. FREDRICKSON

language in contrast to the artificiality and concealment of figured
speech.83 Purity is the quality of unambiguous communication of the
speaker’s thought.84 Paul reiterates this quality of his speech in 4:2
when he commends himself to the world by disclosing the truth (xr\
86
(pavepcoaei tijq aXiiGeiaq),85 a phrase synonymous with mppTicna.
In 2:17 Paul denies that he is like one of the many selling
(KanT\\ex>ovxe<;) the word of God. Although KarcriXeueiv has an impor
tant place in criticism of sophistic rhetoric,87 there is no notion of
“mixing” in Plato’s original use of the term,88 as there is in 2 Cor
2:17. Plato’s criticism falls primarily on the sale of teachings.89 Fur
ther investigation reveals that KajrnAxx; generally designated the inn
keeper,90 whose reputation for adulterating wine was widespread
enough to generate a cliche about deception.91 In 2:17 Paul’s asso
ciation of his speech with purity (e£ eiAaKpiveiaq) stands in antithesis
to the KaTcriXog metaphor and thus falls in line with the ancient cliche.
83
Dion. Hal. Dem. 5, 7, 23; Thuc. 5, 8, 23, 41. See C. Smiley, “Latinitas and
EAAHNIIMOI,” Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin: Philology and Literature Series 3 (1906)
219-24.
84
See J. F. Lockwood, “The Metaphorical Vocabulary of Dionysius of Hali
carnassus,” CQ 31 (1937) 199.
85
Ancient exegetes thought that -rfi cpavepcbaei ri]<; aXn0eia<; referred to deeds con
forming to preaching (e.g., Chrys. Horn. 7 in 2 Cor. 1 [PG 61.454]; cf. Horn. 23 in 2
Cor. 3 [PG 61.557]). Modem interpreters stress fidelity to the Gospel (e.g., Plummer,
The Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 112; Furnish, II Corinthians, 246). Yet
Barrett judiciously notes that “truth” here “has a much wider range of meaning
than the Gospel” (The Second Epistle to the Corinthians [London: A. and C. Black,
1973] 129). Support for this view can be found in Basil (Reg. fits. 9 [PG 31.944]).
86 See above notes 35 and 37.
87 H. D. Betz, Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament (TU 76; Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1961) 114 n. 3; S. Hafemann, Suffering and the Spirit: An Exegetical
Study of II Cor. 2:14-3:3 within the Context of the Corinthian Correspondence (WUNT 2.19;
Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986) 103-26.
88
Hafemann (Suffering and the Spirit, 106-09) is justified in his criticism of Windisch’s
view (“tcctTnitaiJG),” TDJfT 3 [1966] 604-05) that we can arrive at the meaning “to
adulterate” on the basis of the selling of doctrines by sophists and philosophers.
89
The xamiXoi; metaphor continued to be used against rhetors and philosophers
who sold their services. In addition to the parallels cited by J. J. Wettstein (Novum
Testamentum Graecum [1751; 2 vols.; repr. Gras, Austria: Akademische Druck-und
Verlagsanstalt, 1962] 2.183), see SVF 3.172.28; Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 819E; Lucian,
Nigr. 25; Aristid. Rhetor, Or. 3.664-69; Philostr. VA 1.13.
90 T. Kleberg, Hotels, restaurants et cabarets dans I’antiquite romaine: Etudes historique et
phibbgique (Bibliotheca Ekmaniana Universitatis Regiae Upsaliensis 61; Uppsala:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1957) 1-6.
91 Kleberg, Hotels, resburants el cabarets, 3-4, 111-13. For additional references, see
Ar. Thesm. 347; Plut. De Is. et Os. 369C. Paul’s straightforwardness (anXotriq) in 1:12
is thus reiterated in 2:17, since the adjectives KcnnjXiKoi; and axXouq were antonyms.
See, for example, Strab. 11.4.4.1-2; 11.8.7.18.

flAPPHIIA IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES

175

Moreover, the explanation in the Suda of how koctctiAakcck; came to be
equivalent to TtavoupytKOx; demonstrates the connection between adul
teration and trickiness,92 a theme which Paul takes up again in 4:2.
Against this background, then, Paul’s denial in 2:17 should be un
derstood as a refutation of the charge that he lacked 7iappTia{a and
used the tricks of rhetoric to deceive the church.93
In 4:2 the term Ttavoupyia refers to Paul’s alleged use of rhetorical
figures.94 Figures are devious, since they do not present the speaker’s
thought simply and openly.95 Consequently, writers critical of sophis
tic rhetoric contrasted Ttavoupyia with 7tappr|<na.96 The principal
weapon of the flatterer (icotax^) and wily person (7toX,uxpo7i:o<;) is
Ttavoupyia.97
In 4:3 a final charge has been formulated once again in terms
taken from the field of rhetoric: ei §e Kofi sax tv K£KaA,up.p.evov xo
euayyeA,iov Tipcov. The aspect of concealment suggests that the critics
accused Paul of employing covert allusion (6 pexaaxTipaxiap.o<;).98 Al
though distinguished from irony, covert allusion, by veiling thoughts

92 Suda K 334 (ed. A. Adler, Suidae lexicon [4 vols.; Lexicographi Graeci 1.1-1.4; Leipzig:
Teubner, 1928-35; repr. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967-71] 3.28): enei oi Kairn^oi
ovOuXeuouoi xov otvov, cruniiiyvuvtec; ai>xa> aanpov. See also Phryn. PS (I. Bekker, Anecdota
graeca [3 vols.; Berlin: G. C. Nauckium, 1814-21] 1.49.9-11): kohitiXov tppovTHia:
naXipfk>Xx>v teal outc uyiiq. t\ petatpopa arco xcov tcarcriAxov pri ninpaaKovxcov eiXiKpivn Kai
aKepaia xa wvia.
93 For the contrast between nocppiima and adulterated speech which seeks to flat
ter and be pleasant, see Isoc. Or. 2.1-3; Lucian, Hermot. 51; Bas., Reg. Jus. 25.2 (PG
31.985). Paul’s denial in 4:2 of adulterating the word of God (priSe SoXouvxeq xov
Xoyov xou Geou) is a continuation of the same theme. See Windisch, “icaTrnXevG),”
604-05. A connection between kgctctiXeueiv and SoXouv was recogmzed in ancient
lexicography; see Suda K 337.
94 P. Marshall {Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians
[WUNT 2.23; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987] 384) also maintains
that Paul’s denial of using navoupyla should be understood against the background
of philosophic criticism of rhetoric. He suggests, however, that Paul attacks his
opponents’ tricks.
95 Dion. Hal. Lys. 15; Plut. Quomodo adol. 27F-28A; “Longinus,” Subl. 17.1-2.
96 Plut. Quaest. corn. 715F-716B; Praec. ger. reip. 802F; Dio Chrys. Or. 1.26.
97 KoXat,: Lucian, Pise. 18; Dial. Mori. 15.1-2; Plut. Adulator 51C; 60B; De cap. ex
in. ut. 92D. xoXuxponoq: PI. Hp. Mi. 365E; Plut. Quaest. not. 916C; Dio Chrys. Or.
1.61; cf. Plut., frg. 25.
98 For the rhetorical figure axtipaxi^eiv, see Emesti, lexicon, 341-43. For veiled
speech as a means of moral criticism, see F. Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism in
Greece and Rome,” AJP 105 (1984) 174-208. For Paul’s familiarity with covert
allusion, see B. Fiore, “‘Covert Allusion’ in 1 Corinthians 1—4,” CBQ^Al (1985) 85—
102, and John T. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues
of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988)
119-22.
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under other meanings, closely resembled it." Technical discussion of
covert allusion in terms of hiding (Kpu7cxeiv) one’s thoughts goes back
at least to Dionysius of Halicarnassus.100 Hiding thoughts in figures
was the opposite of jiappiicna.101 A number of motives were given for
veiled speech, including the desire not to cause offense when giving
criticism with mppT|aia. 102
Paul turns to the sustained defense of his ministry in 2:14-4:6. In
3:4 we discover that Paul’s possession of confidence is the matter to
be proved. The term jiercotfriaK; has the sense of confidence or boldand is synonymous with xoXpa104 and Qtipaoq.105 It is the conness
106
dition of mind which serves as the basis of Ttappricna.
In 3:5 Paul distinguishes his confidence from the legitimation granted
by moral virtue in the philosophic tradition: ouxoxi &<p’ eodxgw kavof
eapev tayiaaoBaf xi ox;
eauxcbv, aXX' fi 'ucavoxi^ fipwv ek xou 0eou.
The first half of this verse denies that his 7ce7coi0riaiq rests on his own
competence. 107 The second half of the verse argues that Paul does
indeed have the competence, but this comes from God. By placing
his boldness in the context of a divine source, Paul reflects the treat
ment of Tcappriaia in Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, who established
their philosophic mission upon the divine and thus distinguished

99
Quint. Inst. 9.2.45-46, 65-66; Demetr. Eloc. 291.
100 Dion. Hal. Rhet. 8.3, 8. Cf. Quint. Inst. 9.2.76. See also Inst. 9.2.65; Dio Cass.
37.58.1; Plut. Adulator 5ID; De prof,\ in virt. 85C; Ps.-Lucian, Am. 3; Philostr. VS 542;
Them. Or. 3.45D; Lib. Or. 18.19.
101 See Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism,” 174-75. See also Dion. Hal. Rhet. 8.3;
Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 157; Hermog. Irw. 13; Them. Or. 3.45D. Demetrius con
trasts covert allusion with straight speaking (ovk e£ euBeiaq epoupev) and Scythian
speech (ano ItcuBtbv), proverbial for jiappTioia [Eloc. 292, 297).
102 For the motives ascribed to the use of figures, see D. M. Schenkeveld, Studies
on Demetrius on Style (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1964) 117-22; Fiore, ‘“Covert Allusion’,”
91-93; Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism,” 185-96, and Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen
Vessel, 120.
103
Joseph. 47 10.16.
104 Joseph. 4J 1.73.
105
Joseph. 47 3.44-45.
106 Phld. Lib. frg. 45; Joseph. AJ 19.317-18; 1 Clem. 35.2; Eph 3:12. Synonyms
also refer to the psychological basis of bold speech: PI. Leg. 835C; Diod. Sic. 14.65.4;
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.32.7; Epict. Diss. 3.22.96; Philo, Her. 5-7, 19-21, 27-29;
Somn. 2.83; Ios. 222; Prob. 150; Plut. Adulator 66A; Joseph. 47 2.116; Mus. Ruf., frg.
DC; Dio Chrys. Or. 3.13; 4.15; 11.27; 32.11; Lucian, Demon. 50; Iupp. Trag. 19;
Aristid. Rhetor, Or. 28.147.
107 Cf. Gal 6:3, for which Betz’s citations of philosophic material are pertinent for
2 Cor 3:5 (Galatians [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979] 301). For 'ucavoTtiq as
a moral virtue, see SVF 3.68.3-4.
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themselves from the insistence of the Cynics to make everything
depend upon themselves.
I turn now to describe the way 3:7-18 supports Paul’s claim of
confidence in 3:4.108 Proofs based on comparison (cruyKpiaiq) play an
important role in forensic speeches,109 demonstrating inferiority, equal
ity, or superiority.110 3:7-12 is a auYKpiaiq which demonstrates the
superiority of the ministry of the Spirit, also called the ministry of
righteousness, to the ministry of the letter. Whereas the ministry
of the old covenant leads to death and condemnation, the ministry
of the Spirit brings about righteousness. From this comparison, in
3:12 Paul draws the conclusion that based upon the expectation
(e%ovxeq ouv toiocuttiv eXn(5a) of the effects of the ministry of the Spirit
in which he participates, he uses much free speech. Structurally, this
argument is reminiscent of the connection between 7tappT|aia and its
benefits described above in the rhetorical and philosophical tradi
tions. Confident use of free speech rested in knowledge of one’s good
intentions and the likelihood benefits would be bestowed on the
hearers.
The second proof of Paul’s confidence (3:13-18) consists of two
examples, one negative (3:13-15) and the other positive (3:16-18).
Apologies customarily employed both positive and negative examples
as proofs.1,1 The phrase ou Ka0a7iep regularly signals the beginning
of a negative example.112 The negative example using ou xaGanep in
a comparison is common.113 In 3:13, the negative example contrasts
Moses and Paul.114 Moses’ inability to stand up to the scrutiny of his

108 If it is the case that 3:7-12 and 3:13-18 function as proofs supporting die
same proposition (3:4), then Windisch’s interpretation of 3:7-18 as a midrash treating
the superiority of Christianity to Judaism is misguided (Der zweite Korintherbrief 112).
109 Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.30.49; Top. 3.11; 4.23; 10.43; Quint. Inst. 5.10.86-94; Rhet.
Her. 2.19.29; Theon, Prog. 1. See J. Martin, Antike Rhetorih Technik und Methode
(Handbuch der Altertumswissenschafl 2.3; Munich: Beck, 1974) 119-22.
1.0 F. Focke, “Synkrisis,” Hermes 58 (1923) 336-39; 347 n. 1; see also C. Forbes,
“Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul’s Boasting and the Conventions of Helle
nistic Rhetoric,” KTS 32 (1986) 2-8. See Cic. Top. 3.11; 4.23; Hermog. Prog. 8.
1.1 Arist. Rh. 1.2.8-11; 2.20.1-2, 9; Rhet. Her. 4.45.59; 4.49.62.
1.2 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.40.1; Plut. Alex. 23.2; Dio Chrys. Or. 31.4; Lucian, Rh.
Pr. 26; 1 Thess 4:13; John 6:58; 1 John 3:12.
1.3 Plut. Com. Thes. et Rom. 4.1-2; Com. Lys. et Sull. 4.4; Com. Dion et Brut. 1.2.
1.4 Rhet. Her. 4.46.59: “For a Comparison (similitudo) in the form of contrast is
used when we deny that something else is like the thing we are asserting to be
true.” See also Anaximenes, Rh. Al. 8; Cic. Top. 11.47-49; Quint. Inst. 5.11.5-16,
30-31; Aps. Rhet. 8. See B. Fiore, The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and
Pastoral Epistles (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986) 26-32.
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onlookers contrasts shaiply with Paul’s openness before the church,
the world, and God in 1:12-13, 2:17b, and 4:1-2. This contrast sug
gests that Moses hides himself from a sense of shame,115 since in
ancient philosophy there was a frequent connection between shame
and concealment.116 Bad conscience requires hiding.117 The veil indi
cates Moses’ shame, a result of the old covenant (to zeXoc, ton
KaxapYounevou) whose ministry condemns even the one who is its
minister.118
The second example (3:16-18) is positive. Moses’ unveiled face
signifies an end to his shame, and he comes to exemplify freedom
(eA^uBepia). The connection between unveiled face and freedom is
made intelligible by the commonplace that freedom was dependent
upon a good conscience.119 The relevance of this proof for Paul’s
apology rests in the common association between rcappTioia and
eXcuBepfa. Bold speech finds its legitimate basis in the freedom granted
by a good conscience.120 Paul’s likeness to Moses insofar as the latter
115 Origen {Horn. 5 in Jer. 8-9 [.PG 13.305-08]) recognized the connection be
tween veil and shame in 3:13. Although van Unnik (“With Unveiled Face,” 202)
notes the association, he does not adequately explore the philosophic tradition. He
gives extensive evidence of the connection in Jewish tradition in his “The Semitic
Background of riAPPHLIA,” 294-304.
1.6 Xen. Ages. 9.1; PI. Phdr. 243B; SVF 3.101.36-37; Philo, Mut. 198-99; Epict.
Diss. 3.22.15-16; Plut. Com. Lyc. et Num. 3.2; De prof, in virt. 82B; De sera 565B; Vit.
X oral. 845F; Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.48-50; Lucian, Merc. Cond. 2; Pseudol. 21; Dial.
Mori. 20.11; Diog. Laert. 7.3; Mar. Ant. Med. 3.8; Petron. Sat. 7. Philo’s polemic
against Greek mystery rites {Spec. 1.321) offers a particularly instructive parallel to 2
Cor 3:7-18: “Let those who work mischief feel shame (aioxuveoOcooav) and seek
holes and comers of the earth and profound darkness, there lie hid (eniKpuTiTeoOoxjav)
and keep the multitude of their iniquities veiled (enioxid^ovxeq) out of the sight of
all. But let those whose actions serve the common weal use freedom of speech
(nappTiaia) and walk in daylight through the midst of the marketplace, ready to
converse with crowded gatherings, to let the clear sunlight shine upon their own
life.” Here nappritna is based upon the freedom of a good conscience and the ben
efits bestowed. Cf. Isoc. Or. 15.43-44.
1.7 Isoc. Or. 1.16; 3.52; Philo, Ios. 68; Spec. 3.54; 4.6; Plut., De prof, in virt. 85C;
Lib. Or. 15.82-83; Sen. Ep. 43.3-5; 97.12-13; 105.7-8.
118 Against some exegetes who view xoxeXcx; as cessation of glory (e.g., Plummer,
The Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 97; Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief
120; Furnish, II Corinthians, 207). Cf. Rom 6:21-22. I understand xov Kaxapyoopevov
as a reference to the old covenant. In support I point to 3:11 where xo tcaxapyovpEvov
and xo pivov refer to the two covenants. On this point, see Barrett, The Second Epistle
to the Corinthians, 119.
'“9 A saying attributed to Periander (Stob. Flor. 3.24.12) aptly puts the relation
ship: flepiavSpcx; epo>ni0Eiq xi eoxiv eXe\)0epia, elnev ‘iyaOri ouveiSqou;’.
120 Especially important are Epict. Diss. 3.22.18-19, 93—95; Dio Chrys. Or. 32.11;
Philo, Ebr. 148—52; Her. 6-7; Ios. 67-68; Spec. 1.203; Prob. 99, 149—55. See J. F.
Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976) 261-63.
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experiences the removal of the veil is an example of the tietioiOtiok;
before God which Paul claims for himself in 3:4.
After Paul’s defense of his ministry in 2:17-4:6, there is decreasing
emphasis on legitimation and greater attention given to friendship
and reconciliation. Why is this so? We must return to the “letter of
teats.” In addition to proving to his critics that he was capable of
bold speech, this letter had the effect of causing grief to its readers.
This is implied in 2:4 and stated explicitly in 7:8. In order to heal
this pain, Paul places his itappricria in the Greco-Roman tradition of
soul-care,121 which emphasized friendship in the application of free
speech. Paul’s task in chapters 4-7 is to weave together 7tappT)aia
with tpiAJa in order to reconcile the church to himself.
Paul twice alludes to his bold speech in 6:6: ev dycxTifl dvu7coKp(xcp122
and ev Aoyco ataiGelaq. Feigned friendship was routinely criticized,123
particularly by those authors who praised the value of candid speech
in friendship.124 Often equated with flattery, feigned friendship was
the opposite of 7tapp'naia.125 Feigned friendship is inappropriate in
political leadership and moral exhortation where free speech must
be balanced by kindness and good will but not hypocrisy, 126 Paul
again refers to the place of bold speech in his ministry with the phrase
ev Xoyw ataiGeiaq. That 7tappqoia is a matter of speaking the truth is
a philosophic commonplace.127 Reformation of the human condition
requires truth and bold speech.128
Considering the frequent association of 7tappr|aia and Awni in the
philosophic writings, it is not surprising that Paul surrounds his bold
speech with claims concerning his purity (ev ayvoTTyu), self-knowledge

121 For ancient psychagogy, in addition to the work of Hadot cited above in
n. 50, see P. Rabbow, Stelenflhrung: Methodik der Exerziden in der Antike (Munich: Kosel,
1954); B. L. Hijmans, AIKHI1I: Notts on Epictttus’ Educational System (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1959) 41-102; H. G. Ingenkamp, Plutarchs Schrifien iiber dit Heilung der Stele
(Hypomnemata 34; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971).
122 This phrase appears also in Rom 12:9, where the topic is the proper method
of moral exhortation. See also Jas 3:17 and 1 Pet 1:22.
123 Joseph. AJ 16.211; BJ 1.318, 516; 2.587; Plut., ffg. 48; Them. Or. 22.267B;
280A-282C; Olymp. in Grg. 36.2; Eus. Mynd., frg. 22.
124 Cic. Amic. 18.65; 25.92.
125 Ps.-Plut. Dt lib. ed. 13B; Philo, Conf. 48; Prob. 99; Cic. Amu. 25.92-94. See
Bohnenblust, Beitrdgey 16-21.
126 Philo, Ios. 67.
127 See Dem. Or. 6.31; 60.26; Isoc. Or. 15.43; Joseph. AJ 16.108; Lucian, Cont.
13; Pise. 17; Merc. Cond. 4; Pseudol. 4; Dial. Mort. 21.4; Lib. Or. 30.30.
128 Phld. Ub. col. XVB; Lucian, 77m. 36; Vxt. Auct. 8.
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(ev yvcbaei), 129 patience (ev paKpo0up{<}t),130 kindness (ev xp^axoTTiTi),131
and the power of God (ev Suvapei 0eou). 132 With his emphasis on
patience and kindness, Paul places his 7tappTi<na in the Greco-Roman
tradition of soul-care, according to which the combination of bold
speech and gentleness does not reflect inconsistency, as his critics
might assume, but is the practice both of caring teachers and of
friends.
In 6:11 Paul refers to his friendly use of bold speech toward the
church with the phrase “our mouth has remained open toward you
(to axopot Tjpcov dvecpyev rcpoq a)paq). ”133 Some ancient and modern
exegetes correctly note the connection between an open mouth and
mppiiaia.134 Two synonyms of mppriaia help explain this connec
tion: etauGepoaxopetv and Gpaauaxopeiv.135 Friendship is implied in
the notion of an expanded, joyful heart (r\ KapSia t\\i5>v 7ie7tXdxuvxai). 136
The church is not restricted in his heart (ot> axevoxcopeiaGe ev Tipiv),
even as he, as a friend, uses bold speech in moral admonition.137
129 In Gal 6:1 Paul associates self-knowledge (okojmdv oeavtov) with gentleness in
moral admonition.
130 Patience was associated with the gende treatment of sinners. See Ign. Pol. 6.2;
1 Clem. 13.1-4; 19.3; 49.5, 62.2; Bas. Ep. 22.1; 72. See Malherbe, ‘“Gende as a
Nurse’,” 210-14.
131 For zpriatoTTv; as kindness, see G. Spicq, “Benignite, mansuetude, douceur,
clemence,” RB 54 (1947) 321-24. For xp-noTorriq as doing good to others, see SVF
3.64.24, 41; 3.67.8; 3.71.31-37; Mus. Ruf., frg. XTV. According to the psychagogical
tradition, frank moral admonition should aim to benefit rather than condemn. See
Dio Chrys. Or. 32.5, 11, 24; 51.4-5; Plut. De aud. 46F-47A; Adulator 7ID; 7 Clem.
56.2; Mar. Ant. Med. 11.13; Julian, Or. 7.213G; Them. Or. 22.277A-C; Bas. Reg. br.
113 {PG 31.1157).
132 See above for discussion of the role of the divine.
133 For the equivalence to rcappTiaidCeGai, see Isoc. Or. 12.96; Or. Enarr. in Job 3.1
(PG 17.68-69); Lib. Decl. 38.1.42; 47.1.30; Chrys. Incomprehens. 5.6 (PG 48.744); Bas.
Ep. 29.
134 Chrys. Horn. 13 in 2 Cor. 1 (PG 61.491); Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians,
191; Furnish, II Corinthians, 360, 368. Yet all understand the open mouth to be the
personal warmth which they perceive in this section of 2 Cor. This sentimentalizes
Ttappriaia and ignores its sense of pointed criticism.
135 eX£u0Epooxopetv: Aesch. PV 180; Soph. Aj. 1258; Eur. Andr. 153; Dion. Hal.
Ant. Rom. 6.72.5; Philo, Migr. 116; Her. 7; Prob. 99-100, 148-49; see also O. Hense,
“Bion bei Philon,” RhM 48 (1892) 231. Bpaouotopeiv: Aesch. Supp. 203; Th. 612; Ag.
1399; Soph. Phil. 380; Eur. Hec. 1286; Ion 672-75; Lib. Ep. 81.1. See also Joseph and
Aseneth 12.6; Eph 6:19—20; Acts 8:32, 35; 10:24; 18:14; Acts Jo. 32~33. Influence of
the LXX should not be ruled out. See the parallels adduced by Wettstein (Novum
Testamentum Graecum, 2.193) and Windisch (Der zuueite Korintherbriej 210).
136 So Chrysostom, Horn. 13 in 2 Cor. 1 (PG 61.491).
137 The shrinking and expanding heart is a topos in Stoic psychology for grief and
joy: SVF 1.51.19-25; 3.97.36-40; 3.98.30-32; 3.116.5-8; 3.119.30-31; Plut. De lib.
et aegr. 1; Cic. Tusc. 4.31.66-67; Sen. Constant. 9.3. Plutarch’s account of the pleasure
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The topic of bold speech is indicated in 7:2-4 by the phrase 7ioM.fi
pot 7tappr|aia Ttpo^ f)paq. Paul immediately refers to the salutary effect
of his bold speech: 7c0M.fi pot Ka\jxr|ai<; “OTcep upcov. Since Paul’s pride
and joy rest on the church’s repentance (7:7, 9, 12, 15—16),138 7:4
suggests to the readers that his bold speech is justified on the basis
of its good effect.
The theme of bold speech is developed antithetically in 7:2-4 in
order to emphasize Paul’s friendly motives and provide reasons why
the church should make room for him in its heart. First, in a series
of denials in 7:2, Paul dissociates himself from the stereotype of the
self-aggrandizing enemy of social harmony and friendly relations:
of)Seva f|8ucf|capev, ouSeva etpfieipapev, ouSeva e7cMoveKxf|aap.ev.139 In
7:3a, he denies that his speech aims to condemn his readers: Tcpoq
KataKpioiv of) Myco.140 The uses of Tcappriaia for moral edification, on
the one hand, and condemnation, on the other, were well known.141
Harsh Cynics especially were noted for their unbridled use of free
speech to condemn the ills of humankind.142 They understood bold
speech as punishment of human error.143 In 7:3b he reminds the
friendly souls experience with one another may be compared with the Pauline imagery
(De sera 564B-C).
138 For the teacher’s pride in the student’s moral growth, see Sen. Ep. 10.3; 20.1;
34.1-2; Ps.-Diog. Ep. 9. Cf. 1 Thess 2:19. The expression of joy over the recipient’s
moral progress is a convention of the paraenetic letter. See Sen. Ep. 5.1; 19.1; 20.1;
34.1; 35.2-4; 59.1-4.
139 His denials are reminiscent of the popular characterization of the harsh Cynic
philosopher, who not only reviled his hearers but demanded money as well. See
Epict. Diss. 3.22.10, 50; Dio Chrys. Or. 32.11; Lucian, Fug. 7, 13-20; VU. And. 1011; Aristid. Rhetor, Or. 3.666-671. A similar combination of denials prefaces Samuel’s
use of Tiapprioia in Joseph. AJ 6.86-88. See also Philo, Spec. 1.202-204; Acts 20:33
34; Gal 5:15. Note esp. Ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 7.3. The denials of 2 Cor 7:2 are similar
to those in Paul’s presentation of his nappTioia in 1 Thess 2:5-7. It is not the case
that Paul here denies charges that have been made against him as claimed by Barrett
(The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 203) and Furnish (II Corinthians, 369).
140 Paul reiterates the theme of punishment in 7:9: iva ev pii8evi ^tipicoOnTe Tipcov.
Following Windisch (Der zweite Korintherbrief, 221—222), commentators regard 7:3a as
Paul’s attempt to mitigate the severity of the previous denials (7:2), which they
misinterpret as his accusations against the church (e.g., Barrett, The Second Epistle to
the Corinthians, 203; Furnish, II Corinthians, 369).
141 Stob. Flor. 3.13.63; Isoc. Or. 4.130; 8.72; Phld. Lib. frgs. 37-38; col. IB; Lucian,
Pseudol. 3; Dear. Cone. 2; Icar. 30; Ps.-Diog. Ep. 29.2-3; Mar. Ant. Med. 11.6.2. See
Gerhard, Phoenix, 36.
142 See above notes 25-26, 65. Democritus’ laughter condemns (KaxoKpwEi) hu
manity for its inconsistency (Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.40). Cf. Ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 7.2;
9.8. See also Gnomol. Vat. 116, 487.
143 For 7tappT|(ria as a whip (<jkuto<;, pdern^), see Ps.-Diog. Ep. 29.1, 4; Ps.-Soc.
Ep. 12; Plut. Vit. X orat. 842D. Cf. Aotfopfa as a whip: Diog. Laert. 5.18; Philostr.
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church of the friendship in which the bold words were written. Two
topoi on friendship are present in this verse. The first (ev xatq rapSiau;
Tiprnv eaxe) expresses Paul’s mindfulness of the church.144 The second
(eiq to cruvarcoGctveiv Kalau^fjv) indicates the depth of the friendship.145
Finally, in 7:8-12 Paul reviews for his readers the salutary effects
of the rebuke conveyed in the letter of tears. These verses fully re
flect the philosophic discussion of the use of free speech in friendship
for the purpose of moral reformation. The progression in 7:9-10
from the grief the letter of tears caused (etaTtfiOrixe) to repentance
(eXujtriflnxe eiq gexavoiav) and then to salvation (pexavoiav ei<; ocaxtiplav)
places Paul’s characterization of his treatment of the church in the
letter of tears squarely in the psychagogical tradition.146

Conclusion
We may safely conclude from this study that Paul, his audiences,
and his critics were well aware of the philosophic understandings of
Ttappriaia. Paul’s self-presentation as a bold speaker echoes the philo
sophic tradition’s interest in the problem of legitimation and friend
ship. This is not to say, however, that Paul simply repeated tradi
tional formulas. In fact, Paul’s proximity to the philosophic tradition
allows us to reflect on the sharp contrast with his intellectual envi
ronment and to gain insight into the theological character of his public
ministry. This theology of public ministry, powerfully defended in
2 Cor 1-7, was in part Paul’s response to his critics in Corinth,
themselves most likely in sympathy with the harsh Cynic views on
free speech, and who were no doubt irked by what they perceived to
be Paul’s inconsistency, lack of confidence, and adulteration of the
word of God.

VS 487. The notion of the philosopher’s rebuke of sin as the guilty verdict in a legal
proceeding is found in Cynic self-description. See Ps.-Diog. Ep. 28.5. For the Cynic’s
task of punishing (icoXa^eiv) sinful humanity, see Ps.-Diog. Ep. 29.4; Ps.-Heraclit. Ep.
7.4; 9.3; Epict. Diss. 3.22.94, 97-98; Dio Chrys. Or. 9.8.
144 The notion that friends are two bodies with one soul stands behind this for
mulation. See Bohnenblust, Beitrage, 39-40.
145 For the topos that a friend is willing to die for a friend, see the texts cited at
Furnish, II Corinthians, 367. For further examples, see Arist. Eth. Me. 9.8.9; Diog.
Laert. 10.120; Cic. Amic. 7.24; Sen. Ep. 9.10; Lucian, Tox. 6, 36-37. Cf. Rom 5:7;
2 Cor 5:14-15; Phil 2:30.
146 See above for discussion of the role of frank criticism in psychagogy.
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In opposition to the philosophic tradition, in which the issues of
legitimation and friendship were conceptualized either separately or
opposed to one another, Paul consistently and conspicuously brings
them together. The Paul who uses much free speech (2 Cor 3:12
and 7:4) is the same Paul who places that speech in the context of
extreme expressions of friendship (7:2-7). We have seen this union
of freedom of speech and friendship in Phlm 8-9, 1 Thess 2:1-12,
and especially in 2 Cor 3 where the Spirit both frees Paul from
shame (cf. Phil 1:12-20) and empowers him to participate in the
ministry of righteousness. Paul is simultaneously free to speak his
mind and bound to speak for his hearers’ good. This paradox lies at
the heart of 7cappt|<ria in the Pauline episdes.

